

# BRIGANDAGE AND THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF MONARCHICAL LEGITIMACY IN SOUTHERN ITALY

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## Abstract

Political legitimacy plays a pivotal role in securing the effectiveness of a governing system yet, amidst power struggles, rulers face the peril of losing it. This paper studies whether a historical shock in the legitimacy of monarchic rule can have long-term, inter-generational consequences on political attitudes. The unification of Italy ignited a violent reaction against the new ruler in its southern provinces known as the “Great Brigandage”. We use fixed-effects regressions with a wide set of controls and an instrumental variable approach based on suitability of the terrain in order to show that, *ceteris paribus*, municipalities exposed to brigandage in the 1861-1870 period had lower turnout in the 1946 Institutional Referendum and were significantly less likely to vote for the survival of the monarchy. We interpret our findings as evidence that latent preferences toward political systems are endogenously shaped by historical events and can be brought to the surface by changes in the institutional environment.

**Keywords:** political legitimacy, monarchy, tradition, civil conflict, collective memory, persistence of preferences, *Risorgimento*, Southern Italy.

**JEL Codes:** N43, D72, H73, P16.

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# 1 Introduction

Political legitimacy has been widely acknowledged as an essential component of governance in that it sustains compliance with public policies, such as military conscription, taxation, and economic regulation, without the necessity of resorting to force. In many historical contexts, legitimacy can provide the least costly means for authorities to foster compliance, especially when coercive power is deemed unviable, and so bolster the efficacy of policies. As a consequence, legitimate rulers play a crucial role in determining a regime's effectiveness and long-term stability (Greif and Rubin, 2023b).

An institution where legitimacy is particularly relevant is the one of monarchies. Monarchy was the prevalent form of government in Europe from the early Middle Ages through most of the 19th century – with some countries still keeping this institution well alive today – and paved the way to the development of the nation-state. During the formation process of early European states, kings were deemed essential to reduce coordination costs among their subjects and allow deliberation on important, societal matters. Their power was often legitimated through *tradition*, which served as a strong signal of their inherited capability to solve such coordination problems. Hence, the violent repression of individual freedom was justified by the threat of a worse-off equilibrium in the absence of any form of stable government.<sup>1</sup>

But, how do royal dynasties accumulate or erode their legitimacy over time? What role do historical episodes play in shaping the support for monarchy among its subjects and, in turn, contribute to its institutional endurance or demise? In this paper, we study how the legitimacy of monarchy can respond to violent waves of popular revolt

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<sup>1</sup> The political philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were the first to depict authoritarianism and stability as superior alternatives to a primordial, chaotic “state of nature”. This concept was later developed by Max Weber, who offered three formal justifications to the “legitimate monopoly of violence” (i.e., tradition, charisma, and legality). In his original formulation from the 1919 “Politics as a Vocation”, the first justification of (any) form of government is “*the authority of the ‘eternal yesterday’ i.e. of the mores sanctified through the unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform. This is ‘traditional’ domination exercised by the patriarch and the patrimonial prince of yore.*” The second justification is the “*the authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma)*”. The third justification is the “*domination by virtue of ‘legality,’ by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional ‘competence’ based on rationally created rules. In this case, obedience is expected in discharging statutory obligations. This is domination as exercised by the modern ‘servant of the state’ and by all those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him*” (Weber, 1946, p. 4).

and repression and, therefore, affect political preferences over time. In particular, we explore whether areas experiencing a stronger clash with a ruling dynasty may retain their anti-monarchic sentiments across subsequent generations. We focus on the historical case of post-unification Italy, which features a widespread uprising against the new ruler in the early 1860s and a popular referendum on the survival of monarchy in 1946. This vote was a pivotal moment in Italian history: it represented a turning point in the country's transition from fascism to democracy and set the stage for the creation of a modern constitutional chart.

In the aftermath of Italy's unification under the Savoy crown, a diverse social stratum in the southern provinces – motivated by loyalty to the ousted rulers, resentment from unmet expectations, or economic hardship – reacted with an unprecedented burst of violence.<sup>2</sup> This, in turn, grew into a guerilla-based, hard-fought civil conflict: the “Great Brigandage”. Famously, brigand bands lurked in the Mediterranean scrub or *macchia*, from where they sprang surprise attacks against the Italian authorities – still unfamiliar with the southern scenery and not always supported by the local population. Despite the effective repression put in place by the newborn national army, the failed revolt of the brigands still persists in the collective, folkloric memory of the Mezzogiorno – sometimes with an inflated emphasis on their heroism.<sup>3</sup>

The *war against brigandage* ended up engaging a large fraction of the southern population, which goes beyond the rebels themselves. On one hand, local peasants were often suspected to aid the brigands and at times subject to reductions in the freedom of movement, restrictions in the performance of economic activity or, even, deliberate violence. The repressive techniques put in place during the “Great Brigandage” were very salient for the public as the military made extensive use of public executions and

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<sup>2</sup> In the mid-nineteenth century, the Italian peninsula was divided into eight small states. The House of Savoy ruled over the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont, which was the northern hegemonic power. Through a series of diplomatic maneuvers and military operations, it was able to annex the other seven states and so unify modern-day Italy.

<sup>3</sup> Throughout the paper, we interchangeably use ‘Southern Italy’ or ‘Mezzogiorno’ to indicate the territory of the defunct Kingdom of the two Sicilies. Namely, this includes today's regions of Abruzzo, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, and Molise. Sicily is not in the study sample as it did not experience any comparable uprising. On the other hand, during this convulsive stage of Italian history, a new and more lasting phenomenon was planting its seeds: the Mafia (Marciante, 2023).

exposition of corpses, up to retaliation burning and massacres of entire villages.

We combine archival data on brigandage activity in the aftermath of Italian unification (1861-1870) from [Lecce et al. \(2022\)](#) with electoral outcomes from the 1946 round of voting, which included the Institutional Referendum and the Constituent Assembly elections. Using fixed-effects regressions, we compare municipalities within a certain administrative unit and with similar geographic, demographic, and socio-economic characteristics that experienced brigandage versus municipalities that did not. As an alternative approach to mitigate endogeneity bias, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) based on forest cover and rugged terrain, which serve as proxies for naturally-occurring environmental suitability to brigandage. The interaction between these two pull factors, “rugged forests” henceforth, strongly predicts the movement of brigand bands, even after controlling for several potential confounders, and is leveraged as a conditionally exogenous shifter in local exposure to their action and recruiting.

We find that, *ceteris paribus*, municipalities exposed to a higher number of brigandage events in the 1861-1870 period had lower turnout in the 1946 elections and were significantly less likely to vote for the survival of the monarchy. The effects are present both at the extensive and intensive margin and survive the inclusion of region, province, and district fixed effects as well as a wide array of controls measured before unification. These results are reflected in increased support for anti-monarchist political parties in the simultaneous Constituent Assembly election, suggesting that changes in pro-republic votes are not driven by underlying changes in leftist ideological preferences. The IV estimation yields equally-signed, but larger-in-magnitude, coefficients, suggesting that, if anything, our OLS estimates may be biased towards zero.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In online Appendix A, we interpret our findings through the lens of a theoretical model of revolts, borrowed by [Barbera and Jackson \(2020\)](#). The utility of revolting is shown to be a function of expected economic gains and the intrinsic value of monarchic ruling. In the Italian post-unification context, we argue that the conflict between dispersed brigand bands and royal troops may have incurably compromised the traditional legitimacy of the monarchy among the affected population. This antagonism remained mostly silent during the 85-year duration of the kingdom, when the cost of rebelling was high, but surprisingly resurfaced in the first, free elections by universal suffrage in Italy.

Our paper aims at contributing to three strands of literature in economic history. First, we shed light on the political economy of monarchies by studying the short experience of the Savoy dynasty in Italy.<sup>5,6</sup> We exploit the spatial distribution of brigandage activity as a quasi-experimental source of variation in repressed social unrest and measure political preferences through the post-World-War-II elections, which were highly participated by and salient for the citizenry. Importantly for our application, the Italian context features a tight correspondence between the legitimacy of monarchy *as an institution* and the legitimacy of the royal dynasty *as rulers* given that the Savoys represent the only family entitled to run unified Italy throughout its monarchic period. Our findings suggest that persistent attitudes toward government systems are endogenously forged by historical shocks and can be reactivated by changes in the underlying socio-economic and institutional environment.

Second, we echo recent work on the importance of collective memory. The long-lasting legacy of repression on political and economic preferences has been well documented in several contexts.<sup>7</sup> Post-unification Italy offers a compelling setting to study the inter-generational persistence of preferences, with an explicit emphasis on the perceived legitimacy of monarchies: the rebellion of southern brigands represents a clear challenge to the royal authority of Victor Emmanuel II, the first king of Italy. Our results are suggestive that episodes of brigandage during the 1860s are connected with political attitudes against the Savoy monarchy, as expressed 85 years after, at the referendum.

Lastly, the phenomenon of brigandage has been studied by few recent papers. [Del Monte and Pennacchio \(2012\)](#) document that brigand bands were rooted in provinces with high concentration of land ownership and low agricultural produc-

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<sup>5</sup> Extensive research has studied the role of primogeniture succession in providing political stability and economic growth. For instance, [Kurrild-Klitgaard \(2000\)](#) and [Kokkonen and Sundell \(2014\)](#) attempt an empirical test of the political stability ensured by hereditary succession, while [Besley and Reynal-Querol \(2017\)](#) document the association between economic growth and the hereditary succession rule.

<sup>6</sup> Relatedly, [Egorov and Sonin \(forthcoming\)](#) review recent theories and empirical evidence on the political economy of non-democracies, including the problem of succession.

<sup>7</sup> E.g., [Rozenas et al. \(2017\)](#) and [Yaremko \(2022\)](#) in Ukraine, [Chiou and Hong \(2021\)](#) in Taiwan, [Fouka and Voth \(2022\)](#) in Greece, [Miao et al. \(2023\)](#) in China, [Ochsner and Roesel \(forthcoming\)](#) in Austria.

tivity. [Amodio \(2012\)](#) looks at three massacres that occurred during the military intervention against brigandage and reveals that distance from these towns is associated with lower social capital in the twentieth century. [Accetturo et al. \(2017\)](#) show that tougher law enforcement in brigandage-ridden provinces increased political participation of the wealthy, who were the only citizens allowed to vote at that time. Finally, [Lecce et al. \(2022\)](#) find that brigandage episodes were less frequent in the proximity of communities founded by Piedmontese settlers, uncovering the potential role of cultural and social identification for fostering nation building. Our paper adds to the growing literature on Italian unification by focusing on the rejection of monarchy as a persistent response to the brutal war on brigandage.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. [Section 2](#) introduces the historical background and context. [Section 3](#) presents the econometrics analysis, including data, methodology, and results. [Section 4](#) concludes with an overall interpretation of our findings. [Online Appendix A](#) sketches a theoretical framework to relate the study setting to our empirical exercise, while [online Appendix B](#) and [C](#) contain supplementary results from OLS and IV estimation, respectively.

## 2 Historical Background

### 2.1 Italian Unification and the *Great Brigandage*

*«For the southern plebs, the brigand was very often the avenger and the benefactor: sometimes he was justice itself. [...] The people of the southern country very often do not even know the names of the founders of unified Italy, but they remember with admiration the names of Abbate Cesare and Angelo Duca [two famous bandits] and their more recent imitators.»*

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— Francesco Saverio Nitti, “Eroi e Briganti”, 1946, Longanesi, Milano  
(our own translation from Italian).

The unification of modern-day Italy under the House of Savoy was a long and troubled process. It was driven both by an ideological impetus towards national self-determination – a resurrection or *Risorgimento* as it has gone down in history – and by a strategic involvement of the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont, which initially sought to offer an alternative to the hegemonic pull of the revolutionary movements and their project of a federal republic. Precipitated by the Revolutions of 1848, the course of events spanned two wars, several diplomatic negotiations and treaties, and only came to a conclusion in 1861.<sup>8,9</sup>

Despite the failure of the First War of Independence (1848-1849), the Piedmontese were able to reorganize their forces and defeat the Austrians in a second attempt, with the support of France’s Napoleon III, and so annex Lombardy and the provinces of Central Italy by 1860.<sup>10</sup> In the same year, the revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi led the expedition of a thousand Italian volunteers to the conquest of Sicily and a victorious march through the other regions of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. At last, he handed

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<sup>8</sup> For a concise review of the economic and political implications of the unification, see [Zamagni \(2019\)](#) and [Federico \(2023\)](#), among many others.

<sup>9</sup> The military effort will only be considered completed with the annexation of the region of Venetia in 1866 and the Capture of Rome in 1871.

<sup>10</sup> With regard to the Piedmontese strategy mentioned in the first paragraph, notice that the alliance between Sardinia-Piedmont and France had the goal of dividing the Italian Peninsula into two spheres of influence, rather than unifying it under the Savoyard crown.

over his power to King Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia–Piedmont at the celebrated encounter of Teano.

The success of these military campaigns initially received some vast and enthusiastic support among the annexed regions: central provinces were hoping to brought an end to the Austrian domination and misrule, while southern popular masses saw Garibaldi as a timely ally in their uprising against the Bourbons of Naples. However, after the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy on March 17, 1861, the first breaches in the national unity emerged. The extension of the Piedmontese institutions and laws to the rest of Italy was coupled with a process of administrative centralization. In a perhaps emblematic move, the first king of Italy kept his old royal title: Victor Emmanuel *the second*.<sup>11</sup>

In the Mezzogiorno, the introduction of new taxes, compulsory military service, regulation of agricultural markets, and anticlerical provisions were frowned upon.<sup>12</sup> The liberal regime was accused to implement reforms that favored the bourgeoisie rather than local landowners and peasants. In particular, common lands were abolished and the promised redistribution was never delivered. Soon, a motley assortment of common criminals (such as former prisoners and bandits), mercenaries and loyalists of the Bourbon army, some dismissed nobles and many peasants took up arms and revolted against the new rulers.<sup>13</sup>

The phenomenon of *brigandage* precedes the unification of the Italian Peninsula and dates back at least to the Middle-Age feudal system. In the small, pre-unification states, roving bandits were seen as an endemic problem and often repressed with extraordinary violence. This was especially true in the Mezzogiorno, where every

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<sup>11</sup> “A new crown, an old numeration” (our translation from Viarengo, 2017, p. 257).

<sup>12</sup> The salience of these institutional changes was heightened by the level of poverty among peasants, the structure of land ownership, and the history of weak authority and low public investments of the Bourbon state – primarily focused on a few urban centers and marked by little to no interaction with rural areas. See, e.g., the writings on Italy’s Southern Question by Villari (1885) and Fortunato (1911).

<sup>13</sup> This episode has been subject to an extensive historiography, which would be inconceivable to accurately review in this paper. In a nutshell, three main interpretations (political, social, and criminal) have been advanced to explain the emergence of brigandage in post-unification Italy, and historians have debated on which specific nature was the most prevalent. We refer to Vigna (2020) for a comparison of different exponents and a systematic account of the progress recently made on this topic.



revolutionary disturbance, such as the anti-French uprisings of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, saw recurring resurgence of brigandage. However, it is only in the aftermath of Italian unification that such resurgence culminated into a national emergency and became known as the “Great Brigandage”. At the height of the revolt, brigands were organized into bands, with a hierarchical structure, and lurked in the dense forests and steep mountains, typical of the Mediterranean Apennines. They practiced a fierce guerrilla warfare against the Piedmontese army and the newly formed national guard – a number of times with the connivance and support of the local peasantry.<sup>14</sup>

The new kingdom reacted with an even more ferocious repression, which widely employed public executions and exemplary displays of corpses, often captured with a camera and spread to local prints (Ciconte, 2018).<sup>15</sup> A state of siege was declared and a martial law was stipulated to formally sanction the crime of brigandage through military courts. At its peak in 1863, the troops deployed in the Mezzogiorno to quell brigands, counted 90,000 soldiers (Cesari, 1920). The massive presence of the military and their actions determined the defeat of brigand bands and their gradual disappearance by 1870.<sup>16</sup> Despite their defeat, brigandish acts remained imprinted in the collective memory and passed down through the generations, in particular by means of folk ballads and tales that, at times, mix real characters with mythical events.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Molfese (1966) remains unsurpassed as reference monograph on post-unification brigandage in Southern Italy.

<sup>15</sup> In the words of Bollati (1983, pp. 142–143, own translation), “The military, usually so stingy with images, reveals a sudden photographic prodigality during the repression of brigandage [...]. All of a sudden, the distant and objectified impassivity, the silent view, are set aside, and the previously hidden corpses are flaunted. Officers and soldiers collaborate in posing the shot in front of the lens, organize staged performances in which the still-living play the part of the brigand. A crowd of southern and central peasants faces the nation’s history in this macabre way.”

<sup>16</sup> Historians have struggled at gauging the extent of brigandage-related casualties due to the lack of (comprehensive and reliable) official information for both sides of the belligerents. Recent estimates suggest a toll of up to 8,000 losses for the Italian armed forces and 20,000 for the brigands (Ciocca, 2013).

<sup>17</sup> The 1945 memoir by Carlo Levi, “Christ Stopped at Eboli”, being a prominent literary testimony of this tradition.

## 2.2 The Institutional Referendum: “Republic or Monarchy?”

On June 2, 1946, Italy held a historic referendum on the constitutional form of the future state, with voters choosing between a republican and a monarchical system. This vote was the first to be held in Italy with universal suffrage, for both males and females aged over 21, and it would be remembered as a momentous event in the country’s history.<sup>18</sup> However, to understand its significance, it is necessary to look at the context that led up to it.

Italy had been ruled by a one-party dictatorship under Benito Mussolini for over twenty years, until the Allied forces helped partisan Resistance groups to liberate the country from Nazi occupation. After the fall of the Fascist regime, power passed to a transitional government that included both anti-fascist forces and members of the former administration. During this time, King Victor Emmanuel III abdicated in favor of his son, Umberto II, in a desperate bid to preserve the integrity of the kingship, which had been severely undermined by his support for Mussolini in 1922 and a catastrophic participation in the Second World War.<sup>19</sup>

The referendum was a crucial moment, as it would determine the future of Italy’s institutional form. The emergent political factions were divided on the issue: the Christian Democrats took a neutral position, while the Communists and Socialists were in favor of a republic; the monarchists were supported by the conservative parties and the Catholic Church.<sup>20,21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Since 1861, Italy had been a representative monarchy with an hereditary crown and limited male suffrage. The bicameral parliament was formed by the Senate, fully appointed by the King, and the Chamber of Deputies, democratically elected by the propertied and educated classes. Despite the Italian fall into a totalitarian dictatorship during the so-called *ventennio* (1922-1943), the founding constitution remained in effect, at least formally. In the aftermath of the March on Rome, Victor Emmanuel appointed Mussolini as prime minister and, during the following years, the growing political abuses of the fascist regime were unopposed by the King – deemed as “weak, indecisive and excessively devoted to Mussolini” (Mack Smith, 1989, p. 303) by papal diplomats. Therefore, the “monarchy” option at the 1946 referendum was effectively to return to the pre-Fascist constitutional monarchy – with enlarged enfranchisement – while democracy was not at stake.

<sup>19</sup> Many voters, however, saw his abdication as an admission that he did not have the backing of the public opinion; this likely contributed to the strong approval for the republican shift.

<sup>20</sup> The Christian Democrats’ decision came despite many members of the party being in favor of the republic as a way to break with the fascist period. The pro-monarchy position of the Catholic Church, however, forced the party into a rather uncommitted stance.

<sup>21</sup> Besides the distrust on the ruling dynasty, some of the anti-monarchic votes were anti-fascist given that fascism claimed an ideological continuity with the Risorgimento, seen as both founding myth and

The vote was extremely polarized, with the North predominantly in favor of the republic, and the South largely supporting the monarchy.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, there were notable exceptions, with some areas in the North voting for the monarchy and some in the South supporting the republic. In provinces such as Cuneo, Asti, Bergamo, and Padua in the North, the monarchy won the majority of the votes, while Pescara, Teramo, and Trapani in the South supported the republic.<sup>23</sup> This demonstrates the complex nature of the Italian political landscape at the time, with regional, social, and cultural factors playing a paramount role in explaining voting patterns.

The outcome of the referendum was a resounding victory for the republic, with 54.3% of voters choosing this option. The Constituent Assembly, which was elected on the same day, was composed of representatives from all of the main political parties in Italy.<sup>24</sup> This temporary chamber was tasked with the delicate responsibility of drafting a new constitution that would ensure the protection of individual rights and freedoms in a democratic framework. The final text, shaped by the different views in the Assembly, was enacted on December 22, 1947 and came into force on January 1, 1948.

## 3 Empirical Analysis

### 3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics

We combine archival information on brigandage activity during the post-unification period with electoral data from the 1946 Institutional Referendum and the simultaneous project of Italian nationalism (Baioni, 2006).

<sup>22</sup> 64% of the voters went to the republic in the Centre-North, while 66% of the votes in the southern regions were in favor of the monarchy.

<sup>23</sup> There is a total of 7 other provinces in the North where the monarchy surpass 40% of votes without winning, while 11 were the provinces in the South where the republic won more than 40% of votes. A related point is made in the Italian newspaper article "*Referendum, si fa presto a dire 'Sud monarchico'.*"

<sup>24</sup> For completeness, the composition of the assembly was the following: the Christian Democrats (DC – acronyms henceforth in Italian) got 35.21% of the votes; among monarchist parties, the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), received 6.78% joint with the Labour Democratic Party (PDL), the Common Man's Front (UQ) 5.27%, and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL) 2.77%; in the anti-monarchist front, the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), drew 20.68%, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) 18.93%, the Italian Republican Party (PRI) 4.36%, the Action Party (PdA) 1.45%, and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR) 0.09%.

ous Constituent Assembly election outlined in Section 2.

To quantify the spatial exposure to brigandage in the aftermath of Italian unification, we rely on the novel dataset assembled by [Lecce et al. \(2022\)](#), which records the number of episodes of brigandage in the 1861–1870 period for every municipality of Southern Italy at the time. ‘Brigandage’ is broadly defined as spanning from large eruptions of violence against the local authorities and the Piedmontese army, assault on carriages, kidnapping and extortion, non-violent crimes (mostly, arson and theft of cattle), and other evidence on the presence of brigands from official or citizen reports.<sup>25</sup>

Armed with this information, we define a measure of (i) intensity of brigandage, which is equal to the actual number of episodes as described above, and (ii) exposure to brigandage at the extensive margin, taking value one if the municipality experienced at least one event during the study period and zero otherwise.<sup>26</sup> Based on these indicators, the average number of brigandage episodes in a municipality is 5.82 – with 63.1% of municipalities experiencing at least one occurrence. Figure 1 displays the spatial distribution of brigands, documenting how their actions were widely spread across the Mezzogiorno, with the highest concentration in the rural and mountainous areas between Basilicata and Campania.

We observe ‘turnout’ at the municipality level, defined as the share of registered voters who showed up at the polls, the shares of blank, pro-monarchy, and pro-republic votes, and the shares of each political party that ran in that municipality.<sup>27</sup> We further classify parties based on their declared indication of voting to their electorate.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> We refer to the original paper for a more detailed account of how this variable was constructed as well as for more descriptive statistics. The archival source from which the data were digitized is [Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Culturali \(1999–2001\)](#).

<sup>26</sup> For robustness, we also consider transformations of the explanatory variable, such as the inverse hyperbolic sine and the natural logarithm of (i).

<sup>27</sup> There were no important cases of vote rigging, which implies that we can interpret these variables as revealing the political preferences of voters, rather than elite capture.

<sup>28</sup> The Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Common Man’s Front (UQ), and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL) were monarchist, while the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Action Party (PdA), and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR) were anti-monarchist. Despite some debate within the party, the Christian Democrats (DC) decided to not provide any explicit guidance to their supporters. In the results section, we will define the latter group as “free votes”.

After merging this information with the brigandage dataset, we are left with a sample of 1,642 municipalities.<sup>29</sup> Figure 2 confirms the historical picture we depicted in Section 2.2: the majority of Southern Italians voted for keeping the Savoy king in power – with the highest consensus in the Campanian districts of Naples (78.9%) and Salerno (72.1%) and in the Apulian districts of Lecce (75.3%). However, substantial heterogeneity is visible with some municipalities supporting the republic in Abruzzo, Northern Apulia and Calabria, and along the border between Basilicata and Campania. On the other hand, the dominant party was the Christian Democracy (33.9%), with pro- and anti-monarchist parties getting a similar share of the remaining votes (26.5% and 21.3%).

We measure forest cover through the *Forest Map of the Italian Kingdom*, which was published by the Forestry Militia (*Milizia Forestale*) in 1936. This is the first historical document recording the national distribution of forest coverage in 1:100,000 scale: it was digitized and made available by the Italian Forest Service and proven to be reliable for GIS processing by Ferretti et al. (2018).<sup>30</sup> Terrain ruggedness is defined as the maximum difference in altitude within a certain municipality and obtained from the Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Environment (*Ente per le Nuove tecnologie, l'Energia e l'Ambiente* – ENEA).

We borrow a wide set of characteristics of Southern Italian provinces and municipalities from Lecce et al. (2022). Importantly for our econometric exercise, all these variables are measured before the unification process, so they can help predict brigandage, but they are not determined by it. Finally, to provide additional evidence on mechanisms of persistence, we use municipality-level data on post-brigandage crime rates and on the rise of fascism from Acemoglu et al. (2022).

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<sup>29</sup> The matching was done on municipality names after correcting for minor differences in spelling, changes of name, and municipality annexations. We did not attempt to match new municipalities, which were formed after 1870.

<sup>30</sup> This map captures the existence of different types of forests more than 60 years after the end of brigandage, possibly introducing some classical measurement error in our regression analysis. Despite such timing, it is highly improbable that brigand activity could have determined any systematic change in forestation. For instance, Camarretta et al. (2018) study the long-term dynamics of the Italian landscapes and show that the largest patches of forest have been maintained over the last century.

## 3.2 Methodology

### 3.2.1 Linear Regression

We consider the following least-squares estimating equation,

$$Y_{mdpr} = \alpha + \beta \cdot B_{mdpr} + \mathbb{X}'_{mdpr} \delta + f(\text{geolocation}_{mdpr}) + \varepsilon_{mdpr} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y$  is the electoral outcome in municipality  $m$ , district  $d$ , province  $p$ , and region  $r$ .<sup>31</sup>  $B$  measures brigandage activity,  $\mathbb{X} = [\mathbb{W}_{pr}, \mathbb{W}_{mdpr}]$  is a vector of covariates, either at the province- or municipality-level depending on data availability, and  $\varepsilon_{mdpr}$  is the error term. We begin by including region fixed effects,  $\alpha_r$ , and therefore augment the regression model with province covariates,  $\mathbb{W}_{pr}$ , province fixed effects,  $\alpha_p$ , district fixed effects,  $\alpha_d$ , and municipal covariates,  $\mathbb{W}_{mdpr}$ , respectively. All controls enter linearly with the exception of longitude and latitude, *geolocation*, that are accounted for with a smooth function of polynomials,  $f(\cdot)$ .<sup>32</sup> We use robust heteroskedasticity-consistent (Eicker-White) standard errors.<sup>33</sup> As an alternative to asymptotic inference, we also consider [Conley \(1999\)](#) adjustments for spatial correlation of an unknown form<sup>34</sup> and the randomization inference procedure proposed by [Kelly \(2021\)](#), which determines the significance level by looking at the fraction of simulations where a regressor outperforms synthetic noise while holding its estimated spatial structure fixed.

The parameter of interest from our regression model is  $\beta$ . This identifies the effect of brigandage on electoral outcomes provided that there exists no correlation between our explanatory variable  $B$  and the error terms  $\varepsilon$ , after conditioning on fixed effects and covariates. It would be unwise to argue that brigandage events occurred in random locations and with stochastic intensity. On the contrary, brigands were motivated by several factors, such as economic hardship, unmet expectations from the unification pro-

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<sup>31</sup> In the Italian administrative jargon of the time, these correspond to *comune*, *circonscrizione*, *provincia*, and *regione*, respectively.

<sup>32</sup> The basic specification uses a linear polynomial in longitude–latitude, but our results are robust to further expansions, such as adding quadratic and cubic terms.

<sup>33</sup> Clustering at the district level yields very similar confidence intervals. Yet, cluster-robust standard errors may be too conservative for our regression model, given that we only have 55 clusters of different size.

<sup>34</sup> The sensitivity of our OLS estimates to spatial dependence is tested using different cutoff distances (namely, 10, 25 and, 50 kilometers). The resulting standard errors are quite stable across specification.

cess, dissatisfaction with nation-building policies, namely the military draft and taxes; operational and military support were also provided by the Catholic Church and the ousted Bourbons, respectively. Our empirical exercise attempts to address endogeneity by focusing on within-region, within-province and, lastly, within-district variation as well as by partialing out the role of a wide array of potential confounders.<sup>35</sup> Our preferred specification almost boils down to comparing bordering villages, within the same district, where one experienced brigandage and the other did not.

### 3.2.2 Instrumental Variable Approach: “Taking to the Woods”

Despite ruling out some omitted-variable bias, the fixed-effects estimation strategy described above does not address selection of brigandage activity on *un*-observables. To assuage further concerns of endogeneity, we propose an alternative identification strategy, which leverages exogenous variation in exposure to brigandage presence driven by pre-determined geographical characteristics.

As we recounted in Section 2.1, the military tactics of the brigands consisted of pillaging raids into rural towns and ambushes towards the Italian authorities. Despite their explicit distribution into groups,<sup>36</sup> brigands were rather mobile across the southern provinces and exploited their local knowledge (and, sometimes, connivance) in order to surprise the much more modern and organized enemy. Based on this historical evidence, we instrument brigandage presence at the municipality level ( $B_{mdpr}$  in Equation 1) with surrounding forest cover and rugged terrain, which are viewed as providing potential campsites for hideout and point of attack for brigands, rather than recruit-

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<sup>35</sup> In the region-fixed effects specification, we control for a set of province characteristics, such as the number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Moreover, municipality-level variables encompass geographic confounding factors, such as altitude, ruggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861, which are proxies for both soil and climate characteristics, demographics, such as population in 1861 and population growth since 1821, and a finer list of institution- and infrastructure-related classifications, such as the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality in 1839.

<sup>36</sup> Molfese (1966) counts 388 brigand bands, who were active between 1861 and 1870: while some of these were composed by few rebels (5-15), the largest ones reached up to 300-400 individuals.

ing location for new combatants. To achieve that, we build buffers of different radii around the centroid of each municipality in our estimation sample and, then, compute the share of forest as a percentage of the total area of such buffer. This measure is then interacted with ruggedness in order to identify areas that are both forested and rugged, i.e., naturally suitable to brigandage activity.<sup>37</sup>

Municipalities in wooded and impervious areas – where our “rugged forest” instrument takes higher values – are clearly different (smaller in size and population, more agrarian and isolated societies, less developed and connected to central rulers, etc.). Therefore, our causal identification necessarily hinges on the following control strategy: first, we attempt to purge most of these underlying, endogenous differences by including pre-unification variables at the municipality level ( $W_{mdpr}$ ) as a conditioning set; then, we leverage the quasi-random movement of brigand bands using our index of “rugged forests” as a *pull factor* that is orthogonal to municipality political attitudes themselves. The exclusion restriction – our key identifying assumption – holds if the effect of rugged forests on electoral outcomes only goes through brigandage after fixing demographic and socio-economic characteristics, which might be potentially correlated with both rugged forests and electoral outcomes.<sup>38</sup>

### 3.3 OLS Results

**Institutional Referendum.** We begin by regressing referendum voting outcomes on the number of brigandage events. Given that the latter is a non-negative, count variable with many zero-valued observations, in our baseline econometric model, we transform it through the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) function. The resulting measure is defined for all the values of the explanatory variable and, so, allows one to blend extensive and intensive margin; its properties have been shown to be similar to

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<sup>37</sup> Our main results in Section 3.4 are based on a radius of 0.10 degrees – i.e., equivalent to 11.1 kilometers – but similar estimates are obtained with 0.05 (5.55) and 0.25 (25) degrees (kilometers) in online Appendix C.

<sup>38</sup> Besides mitigating endogeneity bias, our IV approach may partially correct for imperfect measurement of treatment exposure. Given the historical nature of our data, mostly based on local reports and court rulings collected by the State Archives, exploiting variation in known geographical predictors of brigandage might reduce attenuation bias in our OLS estimates due to misreporting.



the ones of the logarithmic transformation, namely reducing the impact from outliers (Burbidge et al., 1988).

Table 1 presents the set of regression estimates derived from different model specifications: turnout is consistently found to be negatively associated with the intensity of brigandage. The coefficients remain statistically significant at the 1 percent level and their magnitude stable after the inclusion of higher-dimensional fixed effects and controls. According to our preferred, most demanding specification in Column (7), a one percent change in brigandage, *ceteris paribus*, decreases the share of municipality turnout by 0.59 percentage points (pp), on average.<sup>39,40</sup> We interpret this as suggestive evidence of reduced political representation and civic involvement in locations affected by brigands. However, it is important to notice that the sample mean of the outcome variable is 88.8%, one of the highest turnout rate in Italian history. Besides witnessing the prominence of this round of elections – the first after twenty years of Fascism – this suggests that sample selection into voting is not a reading key to understanding the results that follow.

Among the population who went to the polls, the shares of votes for monarchy is lower in municipalities with higher intensity of brigandage; this mechanically results in a higher share for the republic. Analogously to what we saw for turnout, all the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 or 5 percent level – both when allowing for heteroskedasticity and spatial dependence in the errors – and remain stable after augmenting the model with fixed effects and controls. Using the final specification in Column (7), experiencing an additional percent of brigandage decreases the share of monarchy supporters by 2pp, a sizable change in comparison to the sample mean of the outcome variable (i.e., 63.12%).

The effects are present both at the extensive and intensive margin. Online Appendix

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<sup>39</sup> Using the untransformed regressor in online Appendix Table B1, one additional episode of brigandage decreases the share of municipality turnout by 0.04 pp ( $p$ -value < 0.001). Notice that one episode represents a 17.1% increase compared to the mean number in the estimation sample.

<sup>40</sup> As an alternative transformation, we apply the natural logarithmic function to  $B + 1$  in online Appendix Table B2: the direction, magnitude, and statistical significance of the resulting estimates are almost equal to the ones obtained with the IHS.

Table B3 considers a binary treatment (brigandage versus no brigandage) and shows that being exposed to at least one episode of brigandage is associated with a 0.7pp decrease in turnout and a 3.7pp decrease in monarchy. Compared to the sample mean, these coefficients are politically meaningful differences, which we will further relate to the national outcome of the referendum in our concluding remarks.

Our results are not driven by a few, staunch pro-republic municipalities. Online Appendix Figure B1 plots Gaussian kernel densities of the three main outcomes evaluated so far. Rather than polarizing the electorate into a larger dispersion of votes, the historical exposure to brigandage shifted the entire distribution of monarchic voting to the left.

Online Appendix Tables B4 and B5 employ the continuous measure of brigandage (untransformed and logged, respectively) but restricts the sample to municipalities with at least one episode, i.e., around two-third of the original one. Again, in this subsample, the (positive) number of brigandage episodes predicts lower turnout and less votes for the monarchy, suggesting that the persistent effects on monarchical support arise both at the extensive and intensive margin.

Finally, we assess the degree of spatial correlation in our geographic data. The Moran's  $I$  statistics of the regression residuals, i.e., the two-dimensional analogue of the Durbin-Watson test, across the different model specifications of Equation 1 are reported in online Appendix Table B6. Despite rejecting the null hypothesis of global spatial independence, the magnitude of Moran's  $I$  is low and falls substantially when we control for district fixed effects, suggesting that focusing on within-district variation mitigates the extent of spatial correlation. We take this concern seriously and implement the two-stage randomization inference procedure proposed by Kelly (2021): we generate spatial noise based on 10,000 simulations and regress it on our main explanatory variable.<sup>41</sup> The resulting  $t$ -statistics and  $p$ -values, plotted in online Ap-

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<sup>41</sup> The spatial noise results from drawing a vector of spatially correlated random values of brigandage from a standard normal distribution with a Matérn variance covariance matrix. The shape parameter regulating how fast correlation falls with the range is set to 2 degrees, but results hold with alternative degrees.

pendix Figure B2, demonstrate that the synthetic spatial noise variable has very low explanatory power: compared to the specification in Column (7) of Table 1, noise regressions hardly ever outperform our original measure of brigandage. Taken this together, we conclude that our results are likely not an artifact of spatial correlation and captures the persistent effect of post-unification brigandage on voting preferences.

**Election of the Constitutional Assembly.** We continue our econometric analysis by looking at the preferences for political parties, which were revealed in a simultaneous election. We fit the same regression models as for referendum outcomes and present our baseline estimates in Table 2; the supplementary specifications are then replicated in online Appendix B.

We find that, *ceteris paribus*, both the intensity of and the binary exposure to brigandage increase the share of votes to parties that were overtly opposed to the monarchy. In the former estimation, the increased support for anti-monarchist is driven by less votes for the Christian Democrats, who had not given any indication on the referendum vote; on the other hand, when considering the former measure, the anti-monarchist effect is explained by less votes for monarchist parties. We do not have any definitive answer to explain this discrepancy, but it may be related to both differential turnout and party representation at the polls being correlated with brigandage.

The evidence from referendum and election outcomes presented so far suggests that brigandage affected the distribution of votes along the monarchy-republic margin. It is worth mentioning that these effects are unlikely explained by increased support for a specific, left-wing party. As noted by Blok (1972), brigandage was fundamentally conservative on political grounds and, we argue, it did not have any long-term consequence on ideological preferences for single political parties.

We also rule out that anti-monarchic preferences activated by brigandage are merely stemming from anti-fascist sentiments. One may hypothesize that the attempted repression of organized crime in the 1920s – promoted by Mussolini and its early supporters – targeted areas that had experienced brigandage in the 1860s and, perhaps

so, exhibited persistently higher rates of criminal activity.<sup>42</sup> In such case, voters associating the monarchy with the fascist regime might want to “get their vengeance” at the polls. The empirical results in online Appendix Table B12 reject this potential mechanism: municipalities with higher brigandage activity experienced similar crime rates in the following decade and no detectable difference in fascist violence; votes for the Fascist Party in the 1921 and 1924 elections are also balanced. Ultimately, including all of these measures as additional controls in Equation 1 does not affect our main estimates of interest (online Appendix Table B13).<sup>43</sup>

### 3.4 IV Results

As an alternative to the fixed-effects models estimated above, we fit two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, where our endogenous measure of brigandage is instrumented by one exogenous regressor, i.e., the interaction between forest share and terrain ruggedness, and a varying set of controls. Online Appendix Table C1 provides evidence of instrument strength: rugged forests within 11 kilometers from the center of the municipality positively predict the emergence of brigandage in that municipality – with *F*-statistics well above the canonically-accepted thresholds.<sup>44</sup>

Armed with a strong first stage, Table 3 reports second-stage estimates. In Column (1) and (2), we control for municipality-level characteristics, which capture demographic and socio-economic proxies of development, market access, and political connection. As we pointed out in Section 3.2, we believe this set of included instruments to be key to ensure the credibility of our exclusion restriction, which is a fundamentally untestable assumption of our identification strategy: only after conditioning on such

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<sup>42</sup> Mussolini’s iron-fisted campaign against the Mafia, which culminated with the appointment of Cesare Mori as Prefect of Palermo in 1925, was especially focused on Sicily (Duggan, 1989), which is not part of our study sample (see Footnote 3).

<sup>43</sup> Historical data on post-1870 crime and the rise of fascism from Acemoglu et al. (2022) are only available for a sub-set of our original estimation sample. Therefore, before controlling for potential effect mediators related to fascist repression, we confirm that the brigandage coefficients maintain the same sign and significance level of those in Table 1. Despite losing more than half of the Southern municipalities in our study, the estimates are quantitatively similar to the ones with the full sample.

<sup>44</sup> The results of this test are robust to shrinking or expanding the buffering radius around the municipality (online Appendix Table C2).

set of municipal traits, the effect of rugged forests on individual attitudes towards political institutions and parties can be thought to solely go through brigandage. Columns (3) to (5) take this approach to the extreme by demeaning both instrument and outcome of interest within region, province, and district. This comes at the cost of reducing the extent of unexplained residual variation in our instrument given that the fixed effects mechanically predict a large share of spatial variation in surrounding forest and ruggedness.<sup>45</sup>

The causal effect of brigandage on turnout is found to be negative, statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and larger in magnitude compared to the OLS estimates in the previous sub-section.<sup>46</sup> This is true across specifications, indicating that, even within the same district, the residual variation in rugged forests maintains sufficient power to explain participation in the referendum. On the other hand, experiencing brigandage causes a municipality to express a lower share of its votes to the monarchy and, so, to boost preferences for a republican system. However, in the latter case, the estimated coefficients lose statistical significance once province fixed effects are added to the set of included instruments, in line with the over-controlling bias contemplated above.

Finally, Table 4 reports IV results for Constituent Assembly voting outcomes.<sup>47</sup> Despite these 2SLS estimates are somehow noisier than for referendum outcomes, they broadly confirm a robust, negative relationship between brigandage and preference for monarchist parties. In line with direct substitution between monarchic and anti-monarchic votes, this effect is driven by an increase in the preferences for the explicitly republican parties, rather than the neutral Christian Democrats.

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<sup>45</sup> A regression of region, province, and district dummies on our “rugged forests” instrument yields an adjusted  $R$ -squared of 0.128, 0.277, and 0.390, respectively.

<sup>46</sup> The larger magnitude of the 2SLS coefficients can be explained by: (i) the existence of omitted variables that are positively correlated with electoral outcomes and so introduce upward bias in the OLS estimates; (ii) measurement error that attenuates these coefficients toward zero (see Footnote 38); (iii) heterogeneity in the study population. In particular, the instrument may be shifting the behavior of a sub-group of municipalities where monarchical legitimacy is particularly responsive to a negative shock, such as brigandage. The IV regression leverages this identifying variation, rather than averaging across all the municipalities in the study population, and captures a distinct causal parameter, which is “local” or rather relevant to a sub-set of municipalities.

<sup>47</sup> See online Appendix Tables C5 and C6 for robustness to radius length.

## 4 Conclusion

Nowadays, Europe is often praised as a bastion of parliamentary democracy yet, through most of its modern history, it was ruled by monarchical systems. In this paper, we delve into the brief history of Italian monarchy, from the initial clash in its southern provinces – known as war on brigandage – to its final ousting – brought about by a popular referendum. In particular, we test whether municipalities with a higher exposure to the violent conflict between brigand bands and royal troops retained anti-monarchic sentiments in the long term. Based on our empirical results, we suggest that such confrontation had inter-generational consequences on political attitudes towards monarchic ruling. This legacy can be rationalized through a model of revolts, where the utility of supporting the king is a function of the intrinsic value of monarchical legitimacy.

Our findings are particularly striking in light of the fact that, in the regions of interest, the monarchy won with a rather large margin (66% of the votes). However, electoral data at the municipality level unveil how this victory hides a wide degree of spatial heterogeneity: the mountainous, rural areas where brigands were the most active and, therefore, harsher the military repression, retained their antagonism towards the Savoy dynasty and were more likely to vote for the republic 80 years after.

Taking our point estimates (maybe too) seriously, we can perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation to quantify the extent to which the experience of brigandage shaped the referendum outcomes at the national level. We can compute a linear prediction of voting outcomes for the southern regions, in the absence of brigandage (i.e., setting  $B = 0$  in Equation 1). Assuming no change in turnout, we find that removing brigandage would have increase the votes for the monarchy in our sample by 121,275 units, i.e., 2.25pp. Factoring in the effect of brigandage on turnout is not consequential as the predicted rise in the pro-monarchy front is just of an additional 1,000 votes, without affecting the relative shares. Even if we were to assume that all those who did not go to the polls would have voted for the Monarchy, we would still be below

200,000 extra votes for the king. Keeping everything fixed in the North and in the islands, the margin of republican victory would be reduced from the observed 9pp to an estimated 7pp. After all, a counterfactual world devoid of brigandage would have not prevented the birth of the Italian democratic republic.

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# Main Tables

Table 1: Effect of Brigandage on Referendum Voting Outcomes – OLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Turnout</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-0.5007*** (0.0890)	-0.7023*** (0.0875)	-0.7307*** (0.0887)	-0.7768*** (0.0902)	-0.6606*** (0.0897)	-0.6225*** (0.0936)	-0.5887*** (0.1019)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	88.792						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.512						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.096	0.147	0.150	0.207	0.221	0.224	0.222
<b>Vote for Monarchy</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-1.3050*** (0.3642)	-2.0915*** (0.3564)	-2.0855*** (0.3596)	-1.8512*** (0.3687)	-1.8929*** (0.3906)	-1.8691*** (0.4064)	-1.9975*** (0.4379)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.012] {0.097} (0.210)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.005)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.004)	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	63.123						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.512						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.141	0.235	0.235	0.306	0.308	0.307	0.309
<b>Vote for Republic</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	1.2812*** (0.3648)	2.0719*** (0.3553)	2.0776*** (0.3590)	1.8306*** (0.3657)	1.9687*** (0.3879)	1.9379*** (0.4040)	2.0212*** (0.4351)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.014] {0.110} (0.230)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.006)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.005)	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	30.706						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.512						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.139	0.243	0.243	0.321	0.323	0.322	0.323
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variables refer to the institutional referendum, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, are specified in the bold panel header and range from 0 to 1. The explanatory variable is constructed by taking the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, raggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10 and 25 kilometers (estimated with GMM and using a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets and curly braces, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.

Table 2: Effect of Brigandage on Constituent Assembly Voting Outcomes – OLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-0.0020 (0.3662)	-0.8512** (0.3481)	-0.6841** (0.3449)	-0.9389*** (0.3558)	-0.8656** (0.3745)	-0.9398** (0.3874)	-0.8276* (0.4246)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.997] {0.998} (0.998)	[0.031] {0.061} (0.066)	[0.073] {0.096} (0.137)	[0.009] {0.017} (0.054)	[0.025] {0.029} (0.070)	[0.019] {0.022} (0.048)	[0.058] {0.059} (0.122)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	26.479						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.512						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.098	0.270	0.280	0.316	0.318	0.317	0.318
<b>Anti-Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	1.3831*** (0.3269)	1.9864*** (0.3193)	1.9191*** (0.3206)	1.7833*** (0.3182)	2.0548*** (0.3316)	2.0205*** (0.3451)	1.9646*** (0.3693)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.003] {0.052} (0.144)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.004)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.005)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	21.243						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.512						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.080	0.189	0.194	0.277	0.282	0.281	0.285
<b>Christian Democrats: Free Vote</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-1.6626*** (0.3457)	-1.5850*** (0.3577)	-1.3043*** (0.3589)	-0.8823** (0.3663)	-1.2014*** (0.3801)	-1.0805*** (0.3924)	-1.2069*** (0.4314)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[0.002] {0.004} (0.001)	[0.020] {0.025} (0.015)	[0.004] {0.002} (0.001)	[0.012] {0.006} (0.001)	[0.011] {0.007} (0.001)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	33.894						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.512						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.059	0.101	0.118	0.188	0.197	0.197	0.196
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variables refer to the vote shares (from 0 to 1) for the election for the Constituent Assembly, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, and are specified in the bold panel header. "Monarchist Parties" are the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Common Man's Front (UQ), and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL). "Anti-Monarchist Parties" are the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Action Party (PdA), and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR). The explanatory variable is constructed by taking the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, raggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10, 25 kilometers (estimated with GMM and using a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets and curly braces, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.

Table 3: Effect of Brigandage on Referendum Voting Outcomes – 2SLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>Turnout</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-7.8495*** (1.7273)	-7.0306*** (1.3648)	-4.3765*** (0.8250)	-2.7040*** (0.4760)	-2.4114*** (0.5189)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.7	36.7	70.0	180.9	147.5
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.020	0.038	0.090	0.079
<b>Vote for Monarchy</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-13.4263*** (4.1496)	-12.2508*** (3.4368)	-5.5408*** (2.1363)	-0.3918 (1.4411)	-2.0270 (1.4838)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.7	36.7	70.0	180.9	147.5
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.020	0.038	0.090	0.079
<b>Vote for Republic</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	11.3421*** (3.9474)	10.4386*** (3.3261)	4.1646** (2.1186)	-0.5812 (1.4517)	0.8304 (1.4827)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.7	36.7	70.0	180.9	147.5
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.020	0.038	0.090	0.079
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>					
Municipality-level demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region fixed effects			✓		
Province fixed effects				✓	
District fixed effects					✓

*Notes:* \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variables refer to the institutional referendum, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, are specified in the bold panel header and range from 0 to 1. All regressions are two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the endogenous variable counts the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022), the exogenous regressors or included instruments are the share of forest cover and ruggedness in a 0.10 degree radius; excluded instruments are indicated in the “Regression Model Specification” panel at the bottom of the table. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Effective *F*-statistics are based on the weak instrument test of Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013). Full first-stage estimates are in online Appendix Table C1.


Table 4: Effect of Brigandage on Constitutional Assembly Voting Outcomes – 2SLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>Monarchist Parties</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-5.5870* (3.0098)	-5.1807* (2.6578)	-5.3517** (2.1224)	-0.9071 (1.3036)	-2.7374* (1.4345)
Number of observations	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.6	36.7	70.0	180.7	146.8
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.020	0.038	0.090	0.079
<b>Anti-Monarchist Parties</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	4.6307* (2.7813)	4.5353* (2.4568)	1.7287 (1.8690)	-2.1043 (1.3260)	-1.1222 (1.3560)
Number of observations	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.6	36.7	70.0	180.7	146.8
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.020	0.038	0.090	0.079
<b>Christian Democrats: Free Vote</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-1.0686 (2.7060)	-0.9377 (2.4207)	0.1090 (2.0447)	1.0378 (1.3698)	2.1895 (1.5042)
Number of observations	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.6	36.7	70.0	180.7	146.8
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.020	0.038	0.090	0.079
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>					
Municipality-level demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region fixed effects			✓		
Province fixed effects				✓	
District fixed effects					✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variables refer to the vote shares (from 0 to 1) for the election for the Constituent Assembly, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, and are specified in the bold panel header. “Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Common Man’s Front (UQ), and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL). “Anti-Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Action Party (PdA), and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR). All regressions are two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the endogenous variable counts the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022), the exogenous regressors or included instruments are the share of forest cover and ruggedness in a 0.10 degree radius; excluded instruments are indicated in the “Regression Model Specification” panel at the bottom of the table. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Effective *F*-statistics are based on the weak instrument test of Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013). Full set of first-stage estimates and statistics are in online Appendix Table C1.


# Main Figures

Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Brigandage



*Notes:* colored circles indicate municipalities with at least one reported event of brigandage in the 1861-1870 period in the southern provinces of the Italian Kingdom (Lecce et al., 2022). The size of the circles is weighted by the total number of brigandage events in that municipality. The black borders are based on the contemporary regions of Italy, i.e., its first-level administrative divisions.

Figure 2: Spatial Distribution of Referendum Voting Outcomes



Notes: The original file was produced by [Francesco Migliorini](#) under the [CC BY-SA 4.0](#) license.



# ONLINE APPENDIX

## A Theoretical Framework

The historical context we focus on was characterized by a delicate balance between the incumbent monarchy and multiple forms of political dissent. The royal dynasty of Savoy faced the most serious threats of dispossession during the first decade of the Italian Kingdom, when repressive military operations managed to save their crown, and after World War II, when they ended up losing power so that Italy became a democratic republic. In this section, we describe a theoretical framework that connects these two events to the underlying preferences for monarchy.

### A.1 A Model of Revolts

Barbera and Jackson (2020) develop a model to understand the main incentives that agents face when deciding whether to revolt or not revolt. The authors assume there exists a continuum of citizens of mass 1, indexed by  $i \in [0, 1]$ , that have the choice to participate in a revolt. The revolt is successful if at least  $q \in (0, 1]$  agents participate, otherwise it fails. Here, we will focus on one specific version of the model with three types and one period. The payoffs are relevant only at the end of the game after the potential revolt, as illustrated below:

	<i>Success</i>	<i>Failure</i>
<i>Participate</i>	$\theta_i$	$-C$
<i>Not Participate</i>	$a_i$	0

While the authors focus on the case where  $a_i = 0$  and, therefore, the types only depend on  $\theta_i \in \{\theta_H, \theta_M, \theta_L\}$ , in what follows we will assume that  $a_i \neq 0$ .<sup>48</sup> In our application, the types are such that high types  $H$  will benefit the most from the revolt, so  $\theta_H > a_H$

<sup>48</sup> The analysis follows the same intuition as long as  $\gamma_i := \theta_i - a_i$ , and  $\theta_i$  and  $\gamma_i$  are perfectly and positively correlated so that  $\gamma_i \in \{\gamma_H, \gamma_M, \gamma_L\}$  fully captures the types that coincide with  $\{\theta_H, \theta_M, \theta_L\}$ . In the remainder of this section, we will focus on what  $\theta$  and  $a$  represent, since we can assume that the former parameter is perfectly correlated with  $\gamma$ .




Figure A1: Two possible states (from Barbera and Jackson, 2020, p. 306)

and  $\theta_H > C$ . Moderate types  $\theta_M$  also benefit from the revolt, but less than high types, so  $0 < \theta_M - a_M < \theta_H - a_H$  and  $0 < \theta_M - C < \theta_H - C$ . Low types, instead, prefer the failure of the revolt, so  $\theta_L < C$  and  $a_L < 0$ .

Following Barbera and Jackson (2020), we assume the economy can be in two states: a *High state*, where a share  $1 - z$  of the population are  $\theta_L$ ,  $z/2$  are  $\theta_M$ , and  $z/2$  are  $\theta_H$ , and a *Low state*, where  $z$  of the population are  $\theta_L$ ,  $(1 - z)/2$  are  $\theta_M$ , and  $(1 - z)/2$  are  $\theta_H$ , with  $1 > z > q$ , as represented in Figure A1. Since low types have no incentives to participate, only high- and moderate-type beliefs matter. Indeed, to participate in the revolt we need to have  $b_i \theta_i - (1 - b_i)C \geq b_i a_i$ , where  $b_i$  is the subjective belief that the revolt will succeed. In words, the inequality means that it is more convenient for the agent to participate than not to participate. The condition boils down to a threshold value for beliefs: the agent will revolt if  $b_i \geq b^* = \frac{C}{\theta_i - a_i + C}$ .

Assuming agents are i.i.d. conditional on the type, we have that beliefs are:  $b_i = \frac{\pi z}{\pi z + (1 - \pi)(1 - z)}$ . Hence, high types will revolt if  $\theta_H, a_H, C, z, \pi$  are such that:

$$\frac{\theta_H - a_H}{C} \geq \frac{(1 - \pi)(1 - z)}{\pi z} \quad (\text{A2})$$

and, similarly, moderate types will do the same if:

$$\frac{\theta_M - a_M}{C} \geq \frac{(1 - \pi)(1 - z)}{\pi z} \quad (\text{A3})$$

Notice that knowing  $z \geq q$  does not imply knowing that the other agents will revolt; that is why agents need to form beliefs about the success of the revolt based on what they think others will do. Also, given our assumptions, if Condition (A3) is satisfied, also (A2) will be: the moderate types are the only ones marginally necessary for the revolt.<sup>49</sup>

## A.2 Setting the Model in Our Historical Environment

The model of Barbera and Jackson (2020) described above has been developed to explore the coordination problem of revolts. We now attempt to interpret the phenomenon of brigandage in Southern Italy and its relationship with the later referendum on monarchy through the lens of this model.

First, we define citizens' payoffs by assuming that agents have utility that depends on both the outcome of the revolt and on their decision, so we can rewrite payoffs as:

	<i>Success</i>	<i>Failure</i>
<i>Participate</i>	$U_{i,p,k}$	$U_{i,p,m}$
<i>Not Participate</i>	$U_{i,np,k}$	$U_{i,np,m}$

where  $U_{i,p,k}$  is the utility when the agent participates and the revolt succeeds so that they accomplish an alternative form of government  $k$ ;<sup>50</sup>  $U_{i,np,k}$  is the utility when the agent does not participate but the revolt still succeeds;  $U_{i,np,m}$  is the utility when the

<sup>49</sup> The two-period version of the game looks at the case where Condition (A2) is satisfied but (A3) is not, i.e., moderate types do not have enough incentives to participate. Adding an intermediate period, where high types can “protest” and signal they are high types, make moderate types more confident on the true size of  $z$  and, therefore, on the success of the revolt. The cost of protesting for high types is  $c < C$  and they will protest if:

$$\frac{\theta_H - a_H}{c} \geq \frac{(1 - \pi)(1 - z)}{\pi z} \quad (\text{A4})$$

which is, in turn, satisfied if the condition for high types to revolt is satisfied.

<sup>50</sup> In our setting, the alternative will be the return to power of the House of Bourbon in Southern Italy in the early 1860s and the establishment of a Republic in 1946.

agent does not participate and the revolt fails so they still have the monarchy in power; lastly,  $U_{i,p,m}$  is the utility when the agent participate but the revolts fails anyway. These four payoffs can depend on many features of the revolt and of its outcome. Based on our historical setting, we will focus on two main aspects: consumption and monarchical legitimacy.

We can rewrite  $U_{i,np,m} = u(c_{i,np,m}) + v_i(m)$ , where  $u(c_{i,np,m})$  is the utility function on consumption and  $v_i(m)$  indicates the intrinsic value of being ruled by the monarchy in power,  $m$ . We can further assume that  $U_{i,np,m} = 0$  and so  $\theta_i := U_{i,p,k} - U_{i,np,m} = u(c_{i,p,k}) - u(c_{i,np,m}) + v_i(k) - v_i(m)$ ,  $C := U_{i,np,m} - U_{i,p,m} = u(c_{i,np,m}) - u(c_{i,p,m})$ ,  $a_i := U_{i,np,k} - U_{i,np,m} = u(c_{i,np,k}) - u(c_{i,np,m}) + v_i(k) - v_i(m)$ . In particular, we conjecture that high and moderate types would have two incentives from revolting. On one hand, both the phenomenon of brigandage and the referendum implementation originated from a push for improvement of economic and social conditions, which we proxy by consumption. On the other hand, revolts were connected to the relative value of the new government – with respect to the ruling monarchy –  $V_i := v_i(k) - v_i(m)$ , which is the subject of next Section A.3. Finally, the difference  $\theta_i - a_i = u(c_{i,p,k}) - u(c_{i,np,k})$  derives from the fact that, by participating in the revolt, agents might benefit from the favorable position they will be in the aftermath of their victory.<sup>51,52</sup>

### A.3 Defining the *Legitimacy of the Monarchy*

**A Longstanding Literature.** We see the component of utility derived from the intrinsic value of an alternative government,  $V_i$ , as deeply connected with the concept of monarchical legitimacy. The literature on this theme grounds its roots in the seminal theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who believed the monarch was the one with the ability to enforce a state of law and help humankind break out from the chaos of the primordial “state of nature”. In their work, the legitimacy of monarchies stems

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<sup>51</sup> This would be the case only for types  $H$  and  $M$ , where  $u(c_{H,p,k}) - u(c_{H,np,k}) > u(c_{M,p,k}) - u(c_{M,np,k}) > 0$ .

<sup>52</sup> We abstract from the potential, intrinsic value that agents may derive from being part of a revolt.

directly from the necessity of a unitary and stable government.<sup>53</sup>

Later in the twentieth century, in one of his most influential works, Max Weber offered three formal justifications to the “*legitimate monopoly of violence*”, which is the backbone of the state and of its authority on citizens: “*tradition*”, “*charisma*”, and “*legality*” (see definitions in Footnote 1). The idea of “legal legitimacy” was further developed by Kelsen (1945) and recently explored by Olson (1993), Grossman (2002), and Gerring et al. (2021), among others. These authors argue that the legitimacy of monarchs rest on several factors broadly associated to “tradition”. In their explanatory framework, finding a stable government can be seen as a coordination game where decisions on important matters can be legitimated through the force of tradition, represented by the monarch. This way, the symbolic power of kings proves essential to solve the coordination and deliberation problem of politics.<sup>54</sup>

**Back to the Model.** Inspired by the literature above, we rewrite  $v_i(m) := v_i^t(m) + v_i^l(m) + v_i^c(m)$ , where we are simply assuming the three justifications of legitimacy of a monarch proposed by Weber are separable and additive.<sup>55</sup> We can assume the same decomposition holds for the alternative  $v_i(k)$  so that  $V_i = V_i^t + V_i^l + V_i^c$ . Using this model, we can analyze these components in the two historical moments of interest and set the stage for our empirical analysis.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Locke agrees with the concept of state of nature developed by Hobbes, however he believes that certain rights should still be guaranteed to citizens upon entering society. Given this, the two authors diverge over the necessary qualifications to be a good leader. Hobbes posits that being able to enforce law and order was all that was needed to be a leader, while Locke objects that the leader should enforce the law while being able to preserve a certain level of freedom for his citizens.

<sup>54</sup> In addition, as highlighted by Greif and Rubin (2023b), political legitimacy motivates compliance based on intrinsic motivation and does not depend on extrinsic rewards or punishment.

<sup>55</sup>  $v_i^t(m)$  is the value of the monarch in power that comes from “*tradition*”;  $v_i^l(m)$  is the value that comes from “*legality*”;  $v_i^c(m)$  is the value that comes from “*charisma*”. The assumption of separable and additive values are to simplify the analysis and have no theoretical underpinning.

<sup>56</sup> Here, we do not provide an endogenous formulation of legitimacy, as in Coşgel et al. (2012) and Greif and Rubin (2023a), nor the full equilibrium problem including the response of the ruling authority. Instead, we focus on a decomposition of legitimacy following Weber (1946).

## A.4 Taking Predictions to the Data

Following the discussion in Section A.3, we now outline how interpreting the intrinsic value of monarchical legitimacy in the theoretical framework above can help us draw a throughline between the two events we study in this paper.

During the early establishment of the Italian Kingdom, the traditional legitimacy component of the relative utility of the alternative, i.e., the return of the ousted Bourbons,  $V_i^t$ , was likely very high in Southern Italy as the new king, Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia–Piedmont, had just annexed the whole peninsula at the expenses of the previous king Francis II of Bourbon. Hence, we can imagine that the loyalist faction among the population – our *high types* – and civilian sympathizers close to them – our *moderate types* – would have had a particularly high  $V_i^t$  in that they viewed the exiled monarch as the only legitimate one. In this time period,  $V_i^t$  was arguably the main component of  $V_i$  as new laws were just being announced and established by the new administration and the king was not seen as a principal actor in the annexation process.

The situation was different in 1946, right before the referendum. The royal family of Savoy had been in power for more than eight decades and so  $V_i^t$  should have been, on average, lower compared to the early 1860s. Differently  $V_i^c$  was probably high as many citizens wanted to recover the civil rights they lost during the fascist dictatorship and so embrace a fully democratic system. Finally,  $V_i^l$  might have also been relatively low as the ruler in power was the monarch.<sup>57</sup> However, as the referendum was a legal process to allow the citizens to express their direct preferences over the form of government, it might not have been particularly far from 0 for many agents  $i$ .

In the empirical analysis that follows, we explore the relation between these two historical episodes. As suggested by the literature on collective memory reviewed in the introduction, we hypothesize that the component of preferences related to monarchical traditions, i.e.,  $V_i^t$ , may persist over time and shape the political preferences of future generations. This implies that people living in areas that experienced higher

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<sup>57</sup> In this case, the young Umberto II, as Victor Emmanuel III abdicated a month before the referendum, with the hope of dissociating his personal history as king from the monarchical institution.

intensity of brigandage in the 1860s – hence with higher  $V_i^t$  – should have, *ceteris paribus*, stronger preferences against the Savoy crown. Therefore, we expect them to express lower support for the monarchy at the 1946 polls. In Section 3, we provide a regression-based test of this implication.

## B Supplementary OLS Estimates

Table B1: Effect of Brigandage Events on Referendum Voting Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Turnout</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes</b>	-0.0563*** (0.0097)	-0.0646*** (0.0097)	-0.0654*** (0.0097)	-0.0707*** (0.0096)	-0.0621*** (0.0093)	-0.0570*** (0.0110)	-0.0543*** (0.0128)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	88.792						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	5.829						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.094	0.136	0.138	0.196	0.216	0.217	0.216
<b>Vote for Monarchy</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes</b>	-0.1046*** (0.0381)	-0.1543*** (0.0368)	-0.1531*** (0.0367)	-0.1483*** (0.0371)	-0.1439*** (0.0375)	-0.1461*** (0.0421)	-0.1721*** (0.0460)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.021] {0.093} <0.232	[<0.001] {0.001} <0.019	[<0.001] {0.001} <0.018	[<0.001] {0.001} <0.005	[<0.001] {0.001} <0.006	[0.001] {0.005} <0.010	[0.001] {0.007} <0.014
Sample mean of the outcome variable	63.123						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	5.829						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.137	0.227	0.226	0.301	0.303	0.302	0.304
<b>Vote for Republic</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes</b>	0.1090*** (0.0381)	0.1585*** (0.0364)	0.1580*** (0.0364)	0.1548*** (0.0369)	0.1555*** (0.0374)	0.1564*** (0.0425)	0.1757*** (0.0477)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.017] {0.092} <0.234	[<0.001] {0.001} <0.022	[<0.001] {0.001} <0.019	[<0.001] {0.001} <0.008	[<0.001] {0.001} <0.006	[0.001] {0.004} <0.012	[0.001] {0.008} <0.022
Sample mean of the outcome variable	30.706						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	5.829						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.136	0.235	0.235	0.317	0.318	0.317	0.319
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variables refer to the institutional referendum, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, are specified in the bold panel header and range from 0 to 1. The explanatory variable counts the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, ruggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10, 25, and 50 kilometers (estimated with GMM and a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets, curly braces, and angle chevrons, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.



Table B2: Effect of Brigandage Events on Referendum Voting Outcomes –  $\log(B + 1)$ , OLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Turnout</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes + 1 (logged)</b>	-0.6173*** (0.1087)	-0.8559*** (0.1070)	-0.8893*** (0.1083)	-0.9486*** (0.1101)	-0.8090*** (0.1096)	-0.7619*** (0.1150)	-0.7238*** (0.1264)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	88.792						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.205						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.096	0.147	0.150	0.207	0.221	0.224	0.222
<b>Vote for Monarchy</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes + 1 (logged)</b>	-1.5825*** (0.4435)	-2.5340*** (0.4326)	-2.5261*** (0.4363)	-2.2590*** (0.4475)	-2.3061*** (0.4737)	-2.2847*** (0.4949)	-2.4748*** (0.5372)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.011] {0.099} <0.214	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.006	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.005	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	63.123						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.205						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.141	0.235	0.234	0.306	0.308	0.307	0.309
<b>Vote for Republic</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes + 1 (logged)</b>	1.5584*** (0.4444)	2.5148*** (0.4315)	2.5209*** (0.4358)	2.2407*** (0.4443)	2.4037*** (0.4709)	2.3732*** (0.4928)	2.5054*** (0.5349)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.013] {0.111} <0.233	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.007	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.006	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	30.706						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.205						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.139	0.243	0.242	0.321	0.323	0.322	0.323
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. The outcome variables refer to the vote shares (from 0 to 1) for the election for the Constituent Assembly, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, and are specified in the bold panel header. “Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Common Man’s Front (UQ), and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL). “Anti-Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Action Party (PdA), and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR). The explanatory variable is constructed by taking the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation ( $\text{arsinh}$ ) of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, raggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10, 25, and 50 kilometers (estimated with GMM and a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets, curly braces, and angle chevrons, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.

Table B3: Effect of Binary Exposure to Brigandage on Referendum Voting Outcomes – OLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Turnout</b>							
<b>Brigandage (0/1)</b>	-0.7384*** (0.2229)	-1.1256*** (0.2173)	-1.1754*** (0.2208)	-1.2140*** (0.2249)	-0.9361*** (0.2221)	-0.8888*** (0.2238)	-0.8048*** (0.2267)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.007] {0.024} (0.038)	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[0.001] {0.001} <0.005
Sample mean of the outcome variable	88.792						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	0.689						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.083	0.127	0.129	0.185	0.206	0.211	0.213
<b>Vote for Monarchy</b>							
<b>Brigandage (0/1)</b>	-3.7520*** (0.9529)	-5.2929*** (0.9430)	-5.2603*** (0.9484)	-4.5436*** (0.9402)	-4.5922*** (0.9532)	-4.5051*** (0.9604)	-4.3909*** (0.9758)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.003] {0.020} (0.071)	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	63.123						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	0.689						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.142	0.235	0.234	0.306	0.308	0.307	0.308
<b>Vote for Republic</b>							
<b>Brigandage (0/1)</b>	3.7037*** (0.9542)	5.2693*** (0.9408)	5.2605*** (0.9472)	4.4763*** (0.9301)	4.6884*** (0.9428)	4.6004*** (0.9502)	4.4475*** (0.9658)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.003] {0.025} (0.084)	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	30.706						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	0.689						
Number of observations	1,642						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.141	0.243	0.242	0.320	0.323	0.322	0.323
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variables refer to the institutional referendum, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, are specified in the bold panel header and range from 0 to 1. The explanatory variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the municipality experienced (at least) one episode of brigandage in the 1861-1870 period and to 0 otherwise (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, raggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10, 25, and 50 kilometers (estimated with GMM and a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets, curly braces, and angle chevrons, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.

Figure B1: Distribution of Voting Outcomes by Binary Exposure to Brigandage






Table B4: Effect of Brigandage Events on Referendum Voting Outcomes among Municipalities with at Least One Event – OLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Turnout</b>							
<b>Positive number of brigandage episodes</b>	-0.0531*** (0.0101)	-0.0571*** (0.0100)	-0.0577*** (0.0100)	-0.0626*** (0.0097)	-0.0564*** (0.0096)	-0.0523*** (0.0113)	-0.0525*** (0.0134)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	88.696						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	8.462						
Number of observations	1,131						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.087	0.121	0.123	0.202	0.217	0.216	0.215
<b>Vote for Monarchy</b>							
<b>Positive number of brigandage episodes</b>	-0.0825** (0.0389)	-0.1140*** (0.0376)	-0.1127*** (0.0376)	-0.1155*** (0.0376)	-0.1121*** (0.0380)	-0.1200*** (0.0430)	-0.1539*** (0.0481)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.064] {0.164} <0.323	[0.005] {0.024} <0.111	[0.006] {0.023} <0.113	[0.004] {0.015} <0.055	[0.005] {0.017} <0.058	[0.008] {0.024} <0.064	[0.003] {0.020} <0.052
Sample mean of the outcome variable	62.630						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	8.462						
Number of observations	1,131						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.133	0.223	0.222	0.298	0.299	0.297	0.298
<b>Vote for Republic</b>							
<b>Positive number of brigandage episodes</b>	0.0892** (0.0391)	0.1197*** (0.0374)	0.1187*** (0.0374)	0.1233*** (0.0376)	0.1230*** (0.0380)	0.1301*** (0.0435)	0.1588*** (0.0500)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.046] {0.145} <0.303	[0.003] {0.020} <0.107	[0.003] {0.020} <0.107	[0.002] {0.012} <0.058	[0.002] {0.012} <0.058	[0.004] {0.020} <0.068	[0.003] {0.022} <0.066
Sample mean of the outcome variable	31.046						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	8.462						
Number of observations	1,131						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.141	0.239	0.238	0.317	0.319	0.318	0.319
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. Sample: municipalities with at least one episode of brigandage. The outcome variables refer to the institutional referendum, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, are specified in the bold panel header and range from 0 to 1. The explanatory variable counts the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period: its value is always positive given the sample selection (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, ruggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10, 25, and 50 kilometers (estimated with GMM and a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets, curly braces, and angle chevrons, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.

Table B5: Effect of Brigandage Events on Referendum Voting Outcomes among Municipalities with at Least One Event – Natural Logarithmic Transformation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Turnout</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (logged)</b>	-0.6635*** (0.1236)	-0.7999*** (0.1225)	-0.8254*** (0.1230)	-0.8433*** (0.1218)	-0.7341*** (0.1235)	-0.6805*** (0.1293)	-0.6504*** (0.1450)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001	[<0.001] {<0.001} <<0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	88.696						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.447						
Number of observations	1,131						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.090	0.130	0.133	0.208	0.219	0.220	0.218
<b>Vote for Monarchy</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (logged)</b>	-0.8651* (0.5183)	-1.3765*** (0.4900)	-1.3460*** (0.4921)	-1.0989** (0.4954)	-1.0622** (0.5251)	-1.0288* (0.5514)	-1.2062** (0.6120)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.179] {0.357} <0.456	[0.013] {0.055} <0.141	[0.015] {0.053} <0.145	[0.039] {0.084} <0.127	[0.055] {0.117} <0.157	[0.079] {0.155} <0.189	[0.062] {0.142} <0.166
Sample mean of the outcome variable	62.630						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.447						
Number of observations	1,131						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.133	0.223	0.222	0.296	0.297	0.295	0.296
<b>Vote for Republic</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (logged)</b>	0.8720* (0.5200)	1.3687*** (0.4873)	1.3432*** (0.4896)	1.0972** (0.4903)	1.1428** (0.5221)	1.0980** (0.5488)	1.2215** (0.6096)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.180] {0.361} <0.455	[0.013] {0.054} <0.137	[0.015] {0.051} <0.140	[0.037] {0.089} <0.140	[0.036] {0.097} <0.146	[0.058] {0.134} <0.177	[0.056] {0.141} <0.174
Sample mean of the outcome variable	31.046						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.447						
Number of observations	1,131						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.140	0.239	0.238	0.315	0.317	0.316	0.316
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. Sample: municipalities with at least one episode of brigandage. The outcome variables refer to the institutional referendum, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, are specified in the bold panel header and range from 0 to 1. The explanatory variable is constructed by taking the natural logarithmic transformation (log) of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, ruggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10, 25, and 50 kilometers (estimated with GMM and a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets, curly braces, and angle chevrons, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.

Table B6: Spatial Correlation of Regression Residuals


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Turnout</b>							
Moran's <i>I</i> statistic	0.026	0.013	0.013	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
z-value	15.949	8.422	8.202	3.596	3.514	3.636	3.622
<b>Vote for Monarchy</b>							
Moran's <i>I</i> statistic	0.059	0.028	0.028	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.010
z-value	35.945	17.190	17.202	6.666	6.560	6.554	6.407
<b>Vote for Republic</b>							
Moran's <i>I</i> statistic	0.063	0.030	0.030	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.010
z-value	38.222	18.065	18.080	6.831	6.776	6.784	6.639
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

*Notes:* Moran's *I* statistics and z-values derived from OLS regression as in Table 1. The outcome variables refer to the institutional referendum, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, are specified in the bold panel header and range from 0 to 1. The explanatory variable is constructed by taking the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, ruggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839.


Figure B2: Significance Level of Spatial Noise Regressions

**Distribution of Artificial  $t$ -statistics**


(a) Turnout






(b) Vote for Monarchy



(c) Vote for Republic



**Distribution of Artificial  $p$ -values**



*Notes:* Null randomization distributions derived from OLS regression as in Column (7) of Table 1, where the explanatory variable is replaced with spatial noise that has the same spatial structure of “Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)” across district. The outcome variables refer to the institutional referendum, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, are specified in the bold panel header and range from 0 to 1. “Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)” is constructed by taking the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, ruggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. Vertical lines (in magenta) indicate the actual  $t$ -statistics and estimated in Table 1; corresponding  $p$ -values are lower than 0.001.

Table B7: Effect of Brigandage Events on Constitutional Assembly Electoral Outcomes – OLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes</b>	0.0082 (0.0391)	-0.0297 (0.0370)	-0.0189 (0.0365)	-0.0358 (0.0369)	-0.0287 (0.0376)	-0.0373 (0.0429)	-0.0158 (0.0512)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.858] {0.882} (0.906)	[0.452] {0.459} (0.583)	[0.624] {0.619} (0.732)	[0.327] {0.261} (0.459)	[0.445] {0.380} (0.549)	[0.391] {0.294} (0.454)	[0.763] {0.747} (0.800)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	26.479						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	5.833						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted R-squared	0.098	0.267	0.278	0.314	0.316	0.315	0.317
<b>Anti-Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes</b>	0.1489*** (0.0363)	0.1816*** (0.0348)	0.1756*** (0.0346)	0.1779*** (0.0336)	0.1870*** (0.0343)	0.1932*** (0.0377)	0.1953*** (0.0430)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[<0.001] {0.014} (0.079)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.011)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.013)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.006)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.003)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.003)	[<0.001] {0.001} (0.013)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	21.243						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	5.833						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted R-squared	0.078	0.183	0.188	0.274	0.278	0.276	0.281
<b>Christian Democrats: Free Vote</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes</b>	-0.1518*** (0.0346)	-0.1604*** (0.0352)	-0.1453*** (0.0349)	-0.1251*** (0.0336)	-0.1407*** (0.0339)	-0.1345*** (0.0395)	-0.1652*** (0.0460)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	33.894						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	5.833						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted R-squared	0.054	0.099	0.118	0.190	0.198	0.198	0.197
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. The outcome variables refer to the vote shares (from 0 to 1) for the election for the Constituent Assembly, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, and are specified in the bold panel header. “Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Common Man’s Front (UQ), and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL). “Anti-Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Action Party (PdA), and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR). The explanatory variable counts the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, raggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10, 25, and 50 kilometers (estimated with GMM and a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets, curly braces, and angle chevrons, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.



Table B8: Effect of Binary Exposure to Brigandage on Constitutional Assembly Electoral Outcomes – OLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Brigandage (0/1)</b>	-1.4787 (0.9502)	-3.6999*** (0.9069)	-3.3879*** (0.9000)	-4.0356*** (0.9169)	-3.9141*** (0.9356)	-3.9840*** (0.9399)	-3.7650*** (0.9577)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.214] {0.382} (0.400)	<0.001 {0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	26.479						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	0.689						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted R-squared	0.099	0.275	0.284	0.322	0.324	0.323	0.323
<b>Anti-Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Brigandage (0/1)</b>	3.1819*** (0.8514)	4.4105*** (0.8421)	4.2713*** (0.8429)	3.6904*** (0.8182)	4.0633*** (0.8204)	3.9638*** (0.8277)	3.6611*** (0.8417)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.004] {0.025} (0.094)	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	21.243						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	0.689						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted R-squared	0.077	0.184	0.190	0.272	0.276	0.276	0.281
<b>Christian Democrats: Free Vote</b>							
<b>Brigandage (0/1)</b>	-2.4474** (0.9539)	-1.6822* (0.9612)	-1.0613 (0.9567)	0.2692 (0.9643)	-0.2045 (0.9753)	-0.0138 (0.9783)	-0.0131 (0.9985)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.026] {0.040} (0.034)	[0.128] {0.179} <0.158	[0.329] {0.398} <0.338	[0.776] {0.748} (0.705)	[0.838] {0.801} (0.758)	[0.989] {0.986} (0.983)	[0.990] {0.988} (0.984)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	33.894						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	0.689						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted R-squared	0.051	0.093	0.112	0.185	0.193	0.194	0.192
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variables refer to the vote shares (from 0 to 1) for the election for the Constituent Assembly, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, and are specified in the bold panel header. “Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Common Man’s Front (UQ), and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL). “Anti-Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Action Party (PdA), and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR). The explanatory variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the municipality experienced (at least) one episode of brigandage in the 1861-1870 period and to 0 otherwise (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, ruggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10, 25, and 50 kilometers (estimated with GMM and a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets, curly braces, and angle chevrons, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.

Table B9: Effect of Brigandage Events on Constituent Assembly Voting Outcomes –  $\log(B + 1)$ , OLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes + 1 (logged)</b>	<0.0014 (0.4463)	-1.0031** (0.4236)	-0.8011* (0.4195)	-1.1145** (0.4330)	-1.0249** (0.4557)	-1.1220** (0.4736)	-0.9871* (0.5241)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[1.000] {1.000} <1.000	[0.036] {0.069} <0.083	[0.085] {0.107} <0.162	[0.012] {0.020} <0.065	[0.030] {0.034} <0.084	[0.023] {0.025} <0.058	[0.069] {0.069} <0.144
Sample mean of the outcome variable	26.479						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.205						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted R-squared	0.098	0.270	0.280	0.316	0.318	0.317	0.318
<b>Anti-Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes + 1 (logged)</b>	1.7160*** (0.3989)	2.4419*** (0.3884)	2.3595*** (0.3898)	2.2123*** (0.3873)	2.5389*** (0.4037)	2.5063*** (0.4219)	2.4616*** (0.4549)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.002] {0.049} <0.140	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.005	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.006	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	21.243						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.205						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted R-squared	0.080	0.189	0.194	0.277	0.282	0.281	0.285
<b>Christian Democrats: Free Vote</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes + 1 (logged)</b>	-2.0488*** (0.4192)	-1.9759*** (0.4333)	-1.6408*** (0.4348)	-1.1415** (0.4439)	-1.5269*** (0.4601)	-1.3816*** (0.4776)	-1.5624*** (0.5297)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	<0.001 {<0.001} <0.001	[0.001] {0.002} <0.001	[0.013] {0.016} <0.011	[0.002] {0.001} <0.001	[0.008] {0.004} <0.001	[0.007] {0.004} <0.001
Sample mean of the outcome variable	33.894						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.205						
Number of observations	1,638						
Adjusted R-squared	0.059	0.102	0.119	0.188	0.198	0.198	0.196
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. The outcome variables refer to the vote shares (from 0 to 1) for the election for the Constituent Assembly, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, and are specified in the bold panel header. “Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Common Man’s Front (UQ), and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL). “Anti-Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Action Party (PdA), and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR). The explanatory variable is constructed by taking the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (arsinh) of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecca et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, raggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10, 25, and 50 kilometers (estimated with GMM and a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets, curly braces, and angle chevrons, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.

Table B10: Effect of Brigandage Events on Constituent Assembly among Municipalities with at Least One Event – OLS Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Positive number of brigandage episodes</b>	0.0176 (0.0402)	-0.0043 (0.0374)	0.0011 (0.0371)	-0.0070 (0.0374)	-<0.0017 (0.0380)	-0.0179 (0.0439)	-0.0079 (0.0536)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.687] {0.708} (0.784)	[0.913] {0.911} (0.939)	[0.978] {0.978} (0.985)	[0.846] {0.814} (0.886)	[0.985] {0.981} (0.989)	[0.674] {0.552} (0.730)	[0.881] {0.865} (0.903)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	26.055						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	8.471						
Number of observations	1,128						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.079	0.283	0.292	0.315	0.316	0.316	0.316
<b>Anti-Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Positive number of brigandage episodes</b>	0.1333*** (0.0369)	0.1505*** (0.0353)	0.1463*** (0.0352)	0.1534*** (0.0344)	0.1561*** (0.0348)	0.1705*** (0.0385)	0.1830*** (0.0450)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.001] {0.019} (0.095)	[<0.001] {0.003} (0.044)	[<0.001] {0.004} (0.051)	[<0.001] {0.002} (0.027)	[<0.001] {0.001} (0.021)	[<0.001] {0.001} (0.018)	[<0.001] {0.005} (0.032)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	21.654						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	8.471						
Number of observations	1,128						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.085	0.186	0.191	0.270	0.276	0.276	0.280
<b>Christian Democrats: Free Vote</b>							
<b>Positive number of brigandage episodes</b>	-0.1273*** (0.0347)	-0.1423*** (0.0353)	-0.1320*** (0.0351)	-0.1219*** (0.0344)	-0.1340*** (0.0348)	-0.1193*** (0.0408)	-0.1406*** (0.0486)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.001] {<0.001} (0.002)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)	[0.002] {<0.001} (0.001)	[0.001] {<0.001} (0.001)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	33.343						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	8.471						
Number of observations	1,128						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.068	0.120	0.143	0.204	0.208	0.208	0.205
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. Sample: municipalities with at least one episode of brigandage. The outcome variables refer to the vote shares (from 0 to 1) for the election for the Constituent Assembly, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, and are specified in the bold panel header. "Monarchist Parties" are the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Common Man's Front (UQ), and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL). "Anti-Monarchist Parties" are the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Action Party (PdA), and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR). The explanatory variable counts the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period: its value is always positive given the sample selection (Lecca et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, raggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10, 25, and 50 kilometers (estimated with GMM and a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets, curly braces, and angle chevrons, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.

Table B11: Effect of Brigandage Events on Constituent Assembly Outcomes among Municipalities with at Least One Event – Natural Logarithmic Transformation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (logged)</b>	0.7691 (0.4945)	0.2199 (0.4517)	0.3169 (0.4457)	0.2726 (0.4556)	0.4426 (0.4714)	0.3543 (0.4948)	0.5413 (0.5577)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.229] {0.330} (0.269)	[0.653] {0.609} (0.633)	[0.511] {0.421} (0.529)	[0.552] {0.511} (0.597)	[0.345] {0.284} (0.419)	[0.478] {0.416} (0.537)	[0.343] {0.300} (0.433)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	26.055						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.448						
Number of observations	1,128						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.081	0.283	0.292	0.315	0.317	0.316	0.317
<b>Anti-Monarchist Parties</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (logged)</b>	1.2442*** (0.4690)	1.5647*** (0.4391)	1.4932*** (0.4379)	1.3895*** (0.4385)	1.5218*** (0.4614)	1.5023*** (0.4836)	1.4786*** (0.5337)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[0.030] {0.146} (0.216)	[0.001] {0.012} (0.059)	[0.001] {0.014} (0.071)	[0.002] {0.021} (0.063)	[0.001] {0.012} (0.038)	[0.002] {0.020} (0.047)	[0.006] {0.038} (0.071)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	21.654						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.448						
Number of observations	1,128						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.082	0.183	0.188	0.265	0.272	0.271	0.276
<b>Christian Democrats: Free Vote</b>							
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (logged)</b>	-2.0406*** (0.4918)	-2.1026*** (0.4962)	-1.8536*** (0.4961)	-1.5939*** (0.5064)	-1.9136*** (0.5193)	-1.7426*** (0.5430)	-1.9410*** (0.6068)
<i>p</i> -values corrected for spatial correlation	[<0.001] {<0.001} (<0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (<0.001)	[0.001] {<0.001} (<0.001)	[0.001] {0.002} (0.001)	[<0.001] {<0.001} (<0.001)	[0.001] {0.002} (<0.001)	[0.001] {0.002} (<0.001)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	33.343						
Sample mean of the explanatory variable	1.448						
Number of observations	1,128						
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.074	0.124	0.146	0.205	0.210	0.211	0.208
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>							
Region fixed effects	✓	✓					
Province-level controls		✓					
Province fixed effects			✓				
District fixed effects				✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level geographical controls					✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level demographic controls						✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls							✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. Sample: municipalities with at least one episode of brigandage. The outcome variables refer to the vote shares (from 0 to 1) for the election for the Constituent Assembly, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, and are specified in the bold panel header. “Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Common Man’s Front (UQ), and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL). “Anti-Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Action Party (PdA), and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR). The explanatory variable is constructed by taking the natural logarithmic transformation (log) of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022). Province controls include number of men aged 19-25 eligible for military draft, real estate owners, liberal arts professional workers, farmers, artisans and house servants, fishermen and sailors in 1834-35, as well as the average amount of duties on milled grain, revenues, and public expenditures between 1850 and 1851. Geographic controls include altitude, raggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS with robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p*-values based on Conley (1999) adjustments for cross-sectional correlation up to a distance cutoff of 10, 25, and 50 kilometers (estimated with GMM and a uniform spatial weighting kernel) are reported in square brackets, curly braces, and angle chevrons, respectively. Coefficients are expressed in percentage points.

Table B12: Effect of Brigandage Events on Crime and Fascist Repression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Outcome variable:	Crime rate in 1874	Violent crime rate in 1874	Fascist violence in 1920-22	Fascist local branch in 1921	Fascist vote share in 1921	Fascist vote share in 1924
Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)	-0.4099* (0.2206)	-0.0747 (0.0918)	0.0021 (0.0018)	0.0265* (0.0145)	0.0048 (0.0030)	-0.0060 (0.0043)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	11.143	3.412	0.008	0.115	0.013	0.896
Number of observations	548	548	548	548	440	548
Adjusted R-squared	0.188	0.203	0.139	0.345	0.518	0.259

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. Sample: municipalities with non-missing outcome data from [Acemoglu et al. \(2022\)](#). ‘Crime rates in 1874’ outcomes are expressed as a share of population, ‘fascist violence events in 1920-22’ are per 1,000 inhabitants, ‘fascist local branch in 1921’ is a binary variable (0/1), and ‘fascist vote shares’ are from 0 to 1. The explanatory variable is constructed by taking the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period ([Lecce et al., 2022](#)). All regressions are OLS with district fixed effects and geographic, demographic, and economic controls. Geographic controls include altitude, ruggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table B13: Effect of Brigandage Events on Referendum Voting Outcomes – Controlling for Fascist Repression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Outcome variable:	Turnout		Vote for Monarchy		Vote for Republic	
Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)	-0.3264** (0.1339)	-0.3334** (0.1337)	-2.4058*** (0.7168)	-2.3169*** (0.7288)	2.3815*** (0.7166)	2.2948*** (0.7292)
Sample mean of the outcome variable	89.757		67.351		26.498	
Number of observations	548		548		548	
Adjusted R-squared	0.269	0.265	0.292	0.294	0.297	0.300
<i>Fascism controls</i>		✓		✓		✓

Notes: \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. Sample: municipalities with non-missing outcome data from [Acemoglu et al. \(2022\)](#). The outcome variables refer to the institutional referendum, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, are specified in the bold panel header and range from 0 to 1. The explanatory variable is constructed by taking the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period ([Lecce et al., 2022](#)). All regressions are OLS with district fixed effects and geographic, demographic, and economic controls. Geographic controls include altitude, ruggedness, latitude and longitude of the municipality in 1861. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. Additional controls included in the regression model specifications behind the estimates in the even columns are crime rate and violent crime rates in 1874 (as a share of population), fascist violence events in 1920-22 (per 1,000 inhabitants), presence of a fascist local branch in 1921, and fascist vote share in 1924; fascist vote share in 1921 is not included because it is missing for almost 20% of our estimation sample – see online Appendix Table B12. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

## C Supplementary IV Estimates

Table C1: Effect of the Instrument on Brigandage Events – First-Stage Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>Forest cover × Terrain raggedness</b>	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0010*** (0.0002)	0.0011*** (0.0002)	0.0018*** (0.0001)	0.0017*** (0.0002)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Cragg-Donald Wald <i>F</i> -statistic	24.9	33.6	64.5	158.4	133.8
Kleibergen-Paap <i>rk</i> Wald <i>F</i> -statistic	26.7	36.7	70.0	180.9	147.5
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.058	0.124	0.338	0.436	0.481
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>					
Municipality-level demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region fixed effects			✓		
Province fixed effects				✓	
District fixed effects					✓

*Notes:* \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variable is constructed by taking the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022). Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS, where the exogenous regressor is the share of forest cover interacted with rugged terrain index in a 0.10 degree radius around the municipality centroid and other covariates are indicated in the “Regression Model Specification” panel at the bottom of the table. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.

Table C2: Effect of the Instrument on Brigandage Events – First-Stage Estimates, Short and Long Radiuses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>Radius <math>\rho = 0.05^\circ</math></b>					
<b>Forest cover <math>\times</math> Terrain raggedness</b>	0.0007*** (0.0002)	0.0008*** (0.0002)	0.0010*** (0.0001)	0.0014*** (0.0001)	0.0013*** (0.0001)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Cragg-Donald Wald <i>F</i> -statistic	17.9	26.8	58.4	122.4	96.0
Kleibergen-Paap <i>rk</i> Wald <i>F</i> -statistic	18.7	28.6	61.4	139.1	104.4
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.054	0.120	0.335	0.424	0.470
<b>Radius <math>\rho = 0.25^\circ</math></b>					
<b>Forest cover <math>\times</math> Terrain raggedness</b>	0.0011*** (0.0002)	0.0012*** (0.0002)	0.0014*** (0.0002)	0.0028*** (0.0002)	0.0027*** (0.0002)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Cragg-Donald Wald <i>F</i> -statistic	24.1	31.1	53.8	190.4	155.8
Kleibergen-Paap <i>rk</i> Wald <i>F</i> -statistic	26.5	34.2	53.3	194.0	147.7
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.058	0.122	0.336	0.447	0.489
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>					
Municipality-level demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region fixed effects			✓		
Province fixed effects				✓	
District fixed effects					✓

*Notes:* \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variable is constructed by taking the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022). Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are OLS, where the exogenous regressor is the share of forest cover interacted with rugged terrain index in a radius of degree  $\rho$  (as specified in the panel header) around the municipality centroid and other covariates are indicated in the “Regression Model Specification” panel at the bottom of the table. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.

Table C3: Effect of Brigandage on Referendum Voting Outcomes – 2SLS Estimates, Short Radius

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>Turnout</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	<b>-7.8102<sup>***</sup></b> (2.0316)	<b>-6.6582<sup>***</sup></b> (1.4769)	<b>-3.7537<sup>***</sup></b> (0.8052)	<b>-2.4319<sup>***</sup></b> (0.5286)	<b>-2.1003<sup>***</sup></b> (0.6039)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	18.7	28.6	61.4	139.1	104.4
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.011	0.016	0.035	0.071	0.058
<b>Vote for Monarchy</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	<b>-11.7950<sup>**</sup></b> (4.8849)	<b>-10.4093<sup>***</sup></b> (3.8553)	<b>-4.8858<sup>**</sup></b> (2.2732)	<b>-0.2711</b> (1.6358)	<b>-1.4076</b> (1.7468)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	18.7	28.6	61.4	139.1	104.4
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.011	0.016	0.035	0.071	0.058
<b>Vote for Republic</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	<b>10.0594<sup>**</sup></b> (4.6952)	<b>9.0074<sup>**</sup></b> (3.7705)	<b>3.8994<sup>*</sup></b> (2.2552)	<b>-0.4387</b> (1.6369)	<b>0.4628</b> (1.7355)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	18.7	28.6	61.4	139.1	104.4
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.011	0.016	0.035	0.071	0.058
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>					
Municipality-level demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region fixed effects			✓		
Province fixed effects				✓	
District fixed effects					✓

*Notes:* \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variables refer to the institutional referendum, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, are specified in the bold panel header and range from 0 to 1. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the endogenous variable is equal to the inverse hyperbolic sine of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022), the exogenous regressors or included instrument is the share of forest cover interacted with rugged terrain index in a radius of degree 0.05, and excluded instruments are indicated in the “Regression Model Specification” panel at the bottom of the table. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Effective *F*-statistics are based on the weak instrument test of Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013). Full set of first-stage estimates and statistics are in online Appendix Table C2.



Table C4: Effect of Brigandage on Referendum Voting Outcomes – 2SLS Estimates, Long Radius

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>Turnout</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	<b>-8.8296<sup>***</sup></b> (1.8473)	<b>-8.0723<sup>***</sup></b> (1.5174)	<b>-5.2568<sup>***</sup></b> (0.9911)	<b>-2.7193<sup>***</sup></b> (0.4419)	<b>-2.4117<sup>***</sup></b> (0.4703)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.5	34.2	53.3	194.0	147.7
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.019	0.032	0.106	0.090
<b>Vote for Monarchy</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	<b>-17.1778<sup>**</sup></b> (4.5705)	<b>-15.7857<sup>***</sup></b> (3.8860)	<b>-6.5963<sup>***</sup></b> (2.4062)	<b>-0.3274</b> (1.3330)	<b>-1.9066</b> (1.3775)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.5	34.2	53.3	194.0	147.7
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.019	0.032	0.106	0.090
<b>Vote for Republic</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	<b>14.6576<sup>***</sup></b> (4.3087)	<b>13.5353<sup>***</sup></b> (3.7168)	<b>4.8725<sup>**</sup></b> (2.3714)	<b>-0.7395</b> (1.3487)	<b>0.6085</b> (1.3855)
Number of observations	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631	1,631
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.5	34.2	53.3	194.0	147.7
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.019	0.032	0.106	0.090
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>					
Municipality-level demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region fixed effects			✓		
Province fixed effects				✓	
District fixed effects					✓

*Notes:* \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variables refer to the institutional referendum, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, are specified in the bold panel header and range from 0 to 1. Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the endogenous variable is equal to the inverse hyperbolic sine of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022), the exogenous regressors or included instrument is the share of forest cover interacted with rugged terrain index in a radius of degree 0.25, and excluded instruments are indicated in the “Regression Model Specification” panel at the bottom of the table. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Effective *F*-statistics are based on the weak instrument test of Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013). Full set of first-stage estimates and statistics are in online Appendix Table C2.

Table C5: Effect of Brigandage on Constituent Assembly Voting Outcomes – 2SLS Estimates, Short Radius

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>Monarchist Parties</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-2.2761 (3.5470)	-2.2353 (3.0148)	-3.4945 (2.3523)	0.2152 (1.5739)	-0.9384 (1.7915)
Number of observations	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	18.6	28.5	61.3	138.8	103.7
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.011	0.016	0.035	0.071	0.057
<b>Anti-Monarchist Parties</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	4.0922 (3.4100)	4.0879 (2.8764)	2.1090 (2.0084)	-1.6209 (1.5123)	-1.0464 (1.6093)
Number of observations	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	18.6	28.5	61.3	138.8	103.7
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.011	0.016	0.035	0.071	0.057
<b>Christian Democrats: Free Vote</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-4.4654 (3.2253)	-3.7842 (2.6861)	-1.7990 (2.0870)	-0.2939 (1.5186)	0.5477 (1.6946)
Number of observations	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	18.6	28.5	61.3	138.8	103.7
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.011	0.016	0.035	0.071	0.057
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>					
Municipality-level demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region fixed effects			✓		
Province fixed effects				✓	
District fixed effects					✓

*Notes:* \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variables refer to the vote shares (from 0 to 1) for the election for the Constituent Assembly, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, and are specified in the bold panel header. “Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Common Man’s Front (UQ), and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL). “Anti-Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Action Party (PdA), and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR). Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the endogenous variable is equal to the inverse hyperbolic sine of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Leccese et al., 2022), the exogenous regressors or included instrument is the share of forest cover interacted with rugged terrain index in a radius of degree 0.05, and excluded instruments are indicated in the “Regression Model Specification” panel at the bottom of the table. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Effective *F*-statistics are based on the weak instrument test of Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013). Full set of first-stage estimates and statistics are in online Appendix Table C2.

Table C6: Effect of Brigandage on Constituent Assembly Voting Outcomes – 2SLS Estimates, Long Radius

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>Monarchist Parties</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-6.6643** (3.1371)	-6.1591** (2.7986)	-4.9764** (2.2282)	0.0047 (1.1162)	-2.2836* (1.2418)
Number of observations	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.5	34.2	53.3	194.2	147.2
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.019	0.032	0.106	0.090
<b>Anti-Monarchist Parties</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	6.4399** (2.9456)	6.1574** (2.6497)	2.0141 (2.0543)	-2.2540* (1.2140)	-1.1942 (1.2671)
Number of observations	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.5	34.2	53.3	194.2	147.2
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.019	0.032	0.106	0.090
<b>Christian Democrats: Free Vote</b>					
<b>Number of brigandage episodes (IHS)</b>	-0.2688 (2.6817)	-0.2913 (2.4465)	-0.2106 (2.1471)	0.5846 (1.2346)	2.4713* (1.4149)
Number of observations	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629	1,629
Effective first-stage <i>F</i> -statistic	26.5	34.2	53.3	194.2	147.2
Partial <i>R</i> -squared	0.015	0.019	0.032	0.106	0.090
<i>Regression Model Specifications:</i>					
Municipality-level demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality-level economic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Region fixed effects			✓		
Province fixed effects				✓	
District fixed effects					✓

*Notes:* \*Significant at 10%. \*\*Significant at 5%. \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Unit of observation: municipality. The outcome variables refer to the vote shares (from 0 to 1) for the election for the Constituent Assembly, held in Italy on 2 June 1946, and are specified in the bold panel header. “Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Common Man’s Front (UQ), and the National Bloc of Freedom (BNL). “Anti-Monarchist Parties” are the Italian Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI), the Action Party (PdA), and the Republican Progressive Democratic Front (FDPR). Demographic controls include population in 1861 and population growth since 1821. Economic controls include the presence of an archbishop, a bishop, a civil court, a criminal court, a commercial court, a high school, a middle school, a manufacture, or a hospital in the municipality 1839. All regressions are two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the endogenous variable is equal to the inverse hyperbolic sine of the total number of brigandage events reported for the municipality in the 1861-1870 period (Lecce et al., 2022), the exogenous regressors or included instrument is the share of forest cover interacted with rugged terrain index in a radius of degree 0.25, and excluded instruments are indicated in the “Regression Model Specification” panel at the bottom of the table. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Effective *F*-statistics are based on the weak instrument test of Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013). Full set of first-stage estimates and statistics are in online Appendix Table C2.